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Representation of the Public Interest in Michigan·
Utility Rate Proceedings
l.

INTRODUCTION

While inflation has been a serious economic factor in this country since the mid-sixties, until recently consumers have been able to
take comfort in stable or declining utility rates.1 However, substantial
rate increases both across the nation2 and in Michigan3 have signaled
the end of utility rate stability and have led consumers to focus attention on state regulatory commissions and the process by which
utility rates are determined.4 Prompted by rising utility rates that
had increased the average utility bills paid by Detroiters by 27.1 per
cent over four years, 5 the Detroit Free Press undertook a month-long
study to determine "whether Michigan's rate-paying customers, the
people who pay the bills, are adequately protected by the State of
Michigan.''6 The study concluded, in part:
The pressure for rate increases from eastern investment bankers and
the utilities themselves has pushed the PSC [Michigan Public Service Commission] to a philosophical position much friendlier to the
utility companies than that held either by its own staff or the state
attorney general's office.
At the same time, the rate-paying public is inadequately represented
in utility rate hearings before the PSC, and the commission is under1. Winter, Bigger Utility Bills: Rates for Electridty, Gas, Phone Head up After
Years of Declines, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1969, at 1, col. 8 [hereinafter Winter]. The
experience of the Detroit Edison Co., a major Michigan utility, is illustrative. In 1968,
Edison sought its first rate increase in twenty years. Since that time, however, the
company bas sought increases of 48 million dollars (Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d
463 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1970)), 30 million dollars (Detroit Edison Co., 88 P.U.R.
3d 68 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1970)), and 70 million dollars (Detroit Edison Co.,
U-3910 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., filed May 3, 1971)). See 1971 DETROIT EDISON ANN.
REP. 7; note 8 infra.
;
2. Winter, supra note 1, at 1, col. 8.
3. See MICH. Ptra. SERv. CoMMN., Summary of Recent Rate Cases [hereinafter
Summary], on file with the Michigan Law Review; MICH. PUB. SERv. CoMMN., 1970-71
rate case Revenue Grants, on file with the Michigan Law Review; note 8 infra.
4. Lawson, Utilities' Friend?: California Commission Is Rapped for Handling of
Regulatory Matters, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Lawson]; W"mter,
supra note 1, at 1, col. 8.
5. Cooper &: Shanahan, Utility Bills Rise 27 Pct. in 4 Years, Detroit Free Press,
June 6, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
6. Id. The study culminated in four articles: Cooper &: Shanahan, Utility Bills Rise
27 Pct. in 4 Years, Detroit Free Press, June 6, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Cooper,
June 6]; Cooper &: Shanahan, Utilities Fear a Crisis in Cost Crush, Detroit Free Press,
June 7, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Cooper, June 7]; Cooper, Milliken Has Task:
Filling Utility Post Ticklish, Detroit Free Press, June 8, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter
Cooper, June SJ; Cooper, Why Your Utility Bills Are Going Up, Detroit Free Press, June
9, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Cooper, June 9].
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staffed and cannot keep adequate check on the performance of the
utilities in providing service in fast-growing areas.7

The Free Press study brought the operations of the Michigan
Public Service Commission to public attention at a time when consumer interest in utility rates was quite high. Although the Commission has authorized less than fifty per cent of the aggregate
requests made by the state's four major utilities since the middle of
1969,8 its substantial disagreement with the recommendations of its
7. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. I.
8. The four major utilities are Detroit Edison Co., Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.,
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., and Consumers Power Co.
The following is a list of recently completed rate cases involving major Michigan
utilities:

Rate Adjustment Sought
by Company/Granted
by Commission

Company
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
U-3095
Consumers Power
Co. [Gas]
U-3110
Consumers Power Co.
[Electric]
U-3179
Detroit Edison Co.
U-3189
Michigan Bell
Telephone Co.
U-3204
Detroit Edison Co.
U-3697
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
U-3790
Consumers Power Co.
[Electric]
U-3749
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
U-3934
Michigan Bell
Telephone Co.
U-3838

78
79
82
83

P.U.R.3d
P.U.R.3d
P.U.R.3d
P.U.R.3d

321
375
379
188

(1968)
(1969)
(1970)
(1970)

$ 2G,986,000/4,179,683

28,386,000 /21,308,000

83 P.U.R.3d 188 (1970)

29,453,000/16,514,000

83 P.U.R.3d 463 (1970)

48,000,000/6,514,872

85 P.U.R.3d 467 (1970)

52,300,000/14,799,000

88 P.U.R.3d 68 (1970)

30,000,000/19,043,000

88 P.U.R.3d 168 (1971)

18,413,000/9,200,000
2,739,000

(Order of Dec. 14, 1971)

28,500,000/10,559,400

(Order of Jan. 17, 1971)
(reduced by)

27,513,460/27,513,460
(5,366,000)/(5,366,000)

(Order of April 28, 1972)

59,663,000/ 43,779,000

$343,848,460/170,783,415
•Consumers Power
Co. [Gas]
U-3907
•Detroit Edison Co.
U-3910

(Order of Dec. 22, 1971)
(Order of March 30, 1972)

$31,700,000/6,500,000
$70,000,000/25,000,000

• Interim relief granted prior to determination of full case. Data in the above table
was obtained from rate orders and opinions of the Michigan Public Service Commission.
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staff and the state Attorney General have left it an appealing target
for public criticism.
Beyond the present conditions of rising utility rates, the conclusions drawn by the Free Press study have serious long-range implications for the citizens of Michigan. With the growing awareness of
the environmental implications of utility operations and the finite
limitations of energy generation,9 state regulatory commissions
are likely to broaden their range of regulatory investigations, even
in the face of increasing federal regulation.10 Social problems such
as the equity of utility rate structures11 have been and will continue to be raised before state commissions. To the extent that
the Free Press study casts doubt on the ability of the Michigan
Public Service Commission to protect the public interest during the
present period of rising rates, it also challenges the ability of the
Commission to protect the public interest in the wide range of other
utility regulatory issues that seem destined to have an increasing
impact on citizens of Michigan.
Although the Free Press study centered on political and economic
issues, the operation of the Michigan Public Service Commission also
raises significant issues regarding the role of public intervenors,
agency compliance with statutory requirements, statutory construction, and legislative response to regulatory deficiencies. This Comment will consider the representation of the public interest in Michigan utility proceedings in the context of rate cases involving the
state's major utilities. While such an analysis does not reach the
breadth of activities performed by the Commission, it is suggestive of
the extent to which the Commission is responsive to the public interest generally. Following a description of the rate determination
9. The possibility of large-scale power blackouts in Michigan during the summer
of 1972 has been noted by an official of the Consumers Power Co. and the Chairman of
the Michigan Public Service Commission. Lane, Blackouts Loom in Power Shortage,
Detroit Free Press, March 12, 1972, at 1-A, cols. 3-8. The Public Service Commission
has scheduled a series of public hearings to discuss a ten-year plan to meet state energy
demands "with the least possible harm to the environment." Serrin, State Sets Public
Hearings On Long Range Power Plans, Detroit Free Press, April 11, 1972, at 3-A, cols.
3-6.
10. The increase in federal regulation is illustrated by FPC v. Florida Power &: Light
Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) (sustaining FPC finding of transmission of electrical energy
within interstate commerce); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143
(8th Cir. 1971), afjd., 40 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. April 3, 1972) (sustaining federal pre. emption in regulation of nuclear power plants). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970) which
provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or
compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made
by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political subdivision, where:
(I) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the
order to the Federal Constitution; and,
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and,
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearings; and
(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.
11. See text accompanying notes 57-64 infra.
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process, consideration will be given to isolating deficiencies in the
present process, suggesting reasonable corrective measures, and to a
comparison of several bills pending in the Michigan legislature that
would significantly affect utility regulation.
II.

THE DETERMINATION OF UTILITY RA.TES IN MICHIGAN

Although authority to set utility rates is vested by statute in the
Michigan Public Service Commission,12 the plethora of recent applications for general rate increases has generated the emergence of a
large number of intervenors who have sought to supplement the representation of the public interest in Commission proceedings. In
order to evaluate the adequacy of the present process, it is necessary
to consider not only the operation of the Public Service Commission,
but also the role played by intervenors.
A.

The Michigan Public Service Commission

While Michigan utilities have been subject to some form of regulation since the tum of this century, the Public Service Commission
is only the latest in a long line of state agencies with jurisdiction over
utilities. The office of Michigan Railroad Commissioner was established in 187313 but was replaced by the Michigan Railroad Commission in 1907.14 Two years later the Commission was replaced by
a second Railroad Commission with broader responsibilities,16 but it
was not until 1919 that the Michigan Public Utilities Commission
was established.16 In addition to absorbing the duties of the Railroad
Commission, the Public Utilities Commission was given jurisdiction
over the state's utilities except for municipally owned utilities.17
Legislative dissatisfaction with the operation of the Public Utilities
Commission led to its abolition in 1939, at which time it was replaced
by the Michigan Public Service Commission.18 The statutory authority of the present Commission rides piggyback on its predecessors
since no comprehensive attempt was made to delineate the authority
of the Public Service Commission; instead, the statutes relating to
the Public Utilities Commission and the Railroad Commission were
made expressly applicable to the Public Service Commission.10
12. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 460.6 (1967). The numerous statutory provisions
tracing the development and expansion of commission jurisdiction are listed in the
1963 MICH. PUB. SERV. CoMMN. ANN. REP. 90-94.
13. No. 79, [1873] Mich. Acts 91.
14. No. 312, [1907] Mich. Acts 417.
15. No. 300, [1909] Mich. Acts 704.
16. No. 419, [1919] Mich. Acts 751.
17. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 460.54 (1967).
18. No. 8, [1939] Mich. Acts 7, codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 460.1-.6b (1967).
19. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.4 (1967).
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Failure to revise and update the statutes applicable to the Commission has resulted in a range of inconsistent and ambiguous statutes,
thereby confusing the precise lines of Commission authority.
Presently a division of the Michigan Department of Commerce,20
the Public Service Commission consists of three commissioners appointed by the Governor,21 no more than two of whom may be members of the same political party. The Commissioners serve staggered
six-year terms22 and may not be "pecuniarily interested in any public
utility or public service subject to the jurisdiction and control of the
commission. " 23
The Commissioners preside over an Administrative Division and
four operating divisions: Public Utilities; Finance, Accounts and
Valuation; Railroad; and Transportation.24 Although only the Public Utilities Division and the Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division are directly connected with utility rate regulation, the other
divisions occupy a substantial portion of the Commission's time and
resources.25
The Commission has explicit statutory authority to employ such
personnel "as shall be necessary for the proper exercise of the powers
and duties of the commission."26 Such authority is limited, however,
by the annual state appropriation to the Commission. The staff presently devoted to utility matters (the Public Utilities Division and
the Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division) consists of eleven
engineers, nine accountants, and tw-o hearing examiners.27 Although
the staff is generally recognized as well qualified, it is undermanned
in comparison with regulatory staffs in comparable industrial states.28
The precise role of the Commission staff is not designated in the
statutes, but it appears that the staff was originally designed to serve
in an advisory capacity, assisting the Commissioners in the interpretation of technical matters relating to regulatory activities. The only
20. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 16.331 (1967).
21. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 460.1 (1967). Although the Commission originally
consisted of five members, it was later reduced to three. No. 337, [1947] Mich. Acts 634.
Presently serving as commissioners are: Willis F. Ward, chairman, reappointed to the
Commission in 1969; Lenton G. Sculthorp, appointed to the Commission in 1969; and
William R. Ralls, appointed to the Commission in 1971.
22. MICH. COMP. LAWS .ANN. § 460.1 (1967).
23. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1 (1967).
24. 1969 MICH. PUB. SERV. CoMMN. ANN. REP. 1. Although the 1969 Report indicates
only three operating divisions, the Research and Statistics Section of the Public
Utilities Division has since been elevated to divisional status as the Finance, Accounts
and Valuation Division.
25. The Commission budget more than doubled between fiscal 1968 and 1969
because it assumed the duties of administration and enforcement of vehicle and weight
limits. See 1969 MICH. PUB. SERv. CoMMN. .ANN. REP. at 2.
26. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.3 (1967).
27. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, cols. 6-7.
28. Id. See note 101 infra.
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explicit duty of the staff to investigate a public utility is in connection with requests for partial interim relief pending full Commission
consideration of a company's request for rate relief. 29 In recent years
the Commission has operated under the judicial model in its consideration of rate petitions.30 Under this model, the staff operates as
an adversary party in rate hearings conducted by the Commission.
When a rate application is filed by a utility, the staff conducts an
audit of the utility, prepares financial exhibits, and testifies at the
hearings. It acts as an independent party, rarely consulting the Commissioners regarding the case until the formal hearing.
At the formal hearings, the utility company and the staff present
their positions in a manner similar to a judicial proceeding. The
Commissioners receive testimony and exhibits as a matter of first
impression, unprejudiced by prior consultation with staff members.
Although the staff has conducted the technical and financial investigation of the utility, the presentation of the staff position before the
Commission is made by an Assistant Attorney General who has been
assigned to the Public Service Division of the Attorney General's
office to serve as legal advisor to the Commission. At the conclusion
of the hearings, the Commissioners retire to review the testimony and
issue a written opinion and order setting the utility rates. In recent
years, the relief granted by the Commission has fallen between the
recommendations of the staff and the requests of the companies.31
Under the rule-making authority granted by the Administrative
Procedures Act of 1969,32 the Commission has adopted Rules of
Practice and Procedure Before the Commission that govern the procedural operation of Commission business.33 These rules provide the
criteria for intervention, complaints, and the conduct of formal
hearings.
B.

Intervenors

The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that
a person who claims an interest in a pending proceeding may petition
for leave to intervene, and if granted, shall be considered a full party
29. l\!ICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6a (1967).
20. See Cramton, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Public Utility Rate
Proceedings, 51 IowA L. ru:v. 267, 271-75 (1966), for a brief discussion of the judicial
model in utility regulation.
21. See note 8 supra; Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. 4.
22. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 24.201-315 (Supp. 1972).
22. MICH. PUB. SERV. COMMN., RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE
COMMISSION (1968). Commission rules may also be found in the 1954 Mich. Administrative Code (Supp. 1968). Although promulgated prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969, these rules continue to remain in effect. MICH, COMP,
LAws ANN. § 24.221(1) (Supp. 1972).
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to the proceeding.34 Since the growth in the number and magnitude
of rate increases granted by the Commission began in 1969, the Commission has granted leave to intervene to numerous parties. Attention
will be given to a sample of the major intervenors.

I. The Attorney General
Attorney General Frank J. Kelley commenced intervening in
utility rate cases in 1968 when the Public Service Commission
granted Michigan Bell Telephone Company a selective rate increase
without holding a public hearing.35 In response to the Attorney General's threat to appeal, the Commission ordered public hearings to
reconsider the increase sought by the company. Prior to those hearings, however, the company withdrew its request for rate relief.36
Since that time the Attorney General has intervened in almost
every rate case commenced by a major Michigan utility.37 Although
his office does not conduct a complete independent audit of company
books, it often employs accountants to verify company expenditures
for specific items and does have access to the results of investigations
conducted by the Commission staff.38 The issues raised by the Attorney General cover a broad range of utility activities, and the Attorney
General often presents expert witnesses to testify regarding rates of
return or accounting procedures.39 Specific utility practices such as
the propriety of utility advertising, employment discrimination, depreciation rates and accounting for gains on debt repurchases have
been challenged.40 The Attorney General remains active in pending
cases, and future intervention depends only upon the availability
of financing and legal manpower conversant with utility matters.41
The Attorney General has been perhaps the most outspoken
critic of the major utility companies during this recent period of
rising rates.42 While the four major Michigan utilities sought rate
increases totaling over 215 million dollars in the rate cases completed
34. :M1CH. ADMIN. C. R. 460.21, R. 460.23 (1968).
35. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1968, at 53, col. 7; Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1968, at 9, col. 6.
36. Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1968, at 9, col. 6.
37. Assistant Attorney General Hugh B. Anderson has been the Attorney General's
representative before the Commission. Although an Assistant Attorney General is
present during the hearings to represent the staff, the activities of Mr. Anderson as an
intervenor are completely separate from the presentation of the staff position.
38. Letter from Hugh B. Anderson to student author, Feb. 15, 1972, at 1-2, on file
with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Anderson Jetter, Feb. 15].
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2-3.
42. See generally Statement of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, to
the Price Commission, Washington, D.C., Feb. 26, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law
Review.
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in 1969 and 1970, the Attorney General recommended rate decreases
of 144 million dollars in those same cases.43 The prevailing opinion
is that intervention by the Attorney General has had a positive impact on the regulatory process by supplementing the Commission staff
in representing the public interest.44

2. The City of Detroit
The City of Detroit has intervened regularly in rate cases involving utilities that service the Detroit area46 for over thirty years.40
Because of the limited monetary resources available to the city attorney for such intervention, the city has followed a less ambitious
strategy than the Attorney General.
The City of Detroit does not conduct its own audit or field
43. Selected rate cases completed in 1969 and 1970:
Rate Adjustment Sought by
Company/Recommended by
Attorney General

Company
Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
U-3095
Consumers Power Co.
[Gas]
U-3110
Consumers Power Co.
[Electric]
U-3179
Detroit Edison Co.
U-3189
Michigan Bell
Telephone Co.
U-3204
Detroit Edison Co.
U-3697

78
79
82
83

P.U.R.3d
P.U.R.3d
P.U.R.3d
P.U.R.3d

321
375
379
188

(1968)
(1969)
(1970)
(1970)

$ 26,986,000/(8,600,000) to

(11,300,000)
28,386,000 / (136,000)

83 P.U.R.3d 188 (1970)

29,453,000/(19,554,000)

83 P.U.R.3d 463 (1970)

48,000,000/ (37,432,000)

85 P.U.R.3d 467 (1970)

52,300,000/(49,456,000)

88 P.U.R.3d 68 (1970)

30,000,000 / (28,a21,ooo)
$215,125,000/(143,499,000) to
(146,199,000)

Data obtained from Summary, supra note 3.
44. There has been some speculation in the press that the Attorney General's intervention in rate cases has been in part motivated by a desire to establish an image as a
guardian of the consumer interest in anticipation of the 1972 United States senatorial
election in Michigan. See Cooper, June 9, supra note 6, at 4-A, col. 6. Such speculation
may have detracted from the effectiveness of the Attorney General's intervention to the
extent that some parties to the process may discount his recommendations because of
the suspected motive.
45. Of the four major Michigan utilities under consideration (see note 8 supra),
only Consumers Power Co. does not service the Detroit area.
46. Letter from Robert Reese, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Detroit, to
student author, April 6, 1972, on file with the Michigan IAw Review [hereinafter Reese
letter]. Mr. Reese has intervened on behalf of the City of Detroit for over fifteen years.
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work investigations, nor work closely with the Commission staff.
Rather than challenge the accuracy of particular utility expenditures, the city has challenged the propriety of including certain utility expenses in the operating expenses on which utility rates are
based. In recent years the city has questioned the propriety of considering advertising expenditures and executive fringes (such as
membership dues in Detroit area social organizations) in the determination of utility rates.47
Perhaps more importantly, the city regularly presents its own
expert ·witnesses to testify at rate hearings regarding the rate of return
that the Public Service Commission should allow.48 The city has
spent approximately 25,000 dollars per rate case49 in order to present
a utility specialist who is neither connected with the state nor paid
by the utility companies. Although the city cannot be expected to
expand its role in Commission proceedings because of its :financial
limitations, it does provide additional information on which the
Commission may base its decision.

3.

United Auto Workers

A more recent entrant into the regulatory field is the United
Auto Workers, which has intervened in two rate cases and has been
actively engaged in legislative efforts to alter the process by which
rates are determined. 60 The strategy of the UAW in the recent
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. case 51 is illustrative of the role it can
be expected to play in the regulatory process. The UAW cross-examined staff and company witnesses, made specific recommendations
regarding the Bell rate structure, and attacked Bell advertising. 52
Limited technical skill and funding will prevent the UAW from
examining utility :financial records and facilities on which aggregate
utility revenues are based, but in specialized areas the UAW may be
able to challenge utility practices more vigorously than even the
Commission staff. In the Bell case, for example, the UAW argued
that the company had falsely advertised to its customers that any
increase in telephone bills would be due to increased phone usage
rather than increased rates. After evidence was presented regarding
misleading advertisements, the parties agreed at a settlement conference that Bell would publish a clarification to be inserted in a
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at I.
49. Id.
50. Letter from Daniel P. Dozier, Assistant Legal Counsel, Community Action Program Dept., UAW, to student author, April 21, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law
Review [hereinafter Dozier letter].
51. U-3838 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., April 28, 1972).
52. Dozier letter, supra note 50, at I.
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monthly billing.153 The UAW also participated, in conjunction with
the Attorney General's office and the City of Detroit, in an attack on
Detroit Edison Company advertising arising from rate case U-3910.'H
The Public Service Commission subsequently ordered Edison to
charge the cost of advertising relating to that case to its stockholders
and to cease and desist from any further such advertising during
the pendency of the case.66 Since utility advertising does not constitute a large component of cost of service, it is unlikely that the Commission staff would have challenged advertising practices. And yet,
because public opinion can have an impact on the rate policy of the
company and the Commission, care must be taken to assure that the
public in general, and rate-payers and stockholders in particular, do
not receive distorted impressions of the impact and cause of rising
rates.
The UAW can also promote the public interest through its lobbying activities in the Michigan legislature. Significant legislation is
now pending that would have an enormous impact on the Public
Service Commission, and the UAW can act to balance the input
which the full-time lobbyists of the major Michigan utilities exert
on the legislative process.66
4. Consumer Alliance of Michigan
Although the Consumer Alliance of Michigan has formally intervened in the most recent Detroit Edison case,67 it has concentrated
53. The false advertising charges were treated as a formal complaint and were assigned docket number U-3986, and subsequently dismissed by stipulation of the parties.
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., U-3986 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Nov. 10, 1971).
A copy of the stipulation is on file with the Michigan Law Review. The clarification was sent to Bell customers in the December 1971 phone bills. In relevant part the
statement, which was entitled Let's Try Once More, reads:
In our advertising, we stated that "increased bills come largely from increased
usage (not increased rates)." This has been true for many years, However, it is also
true that bills went up because of the October, 1970 rate increase, quite apart from
any increase in usage.
We also said that customers should not expect the proposed rate increase to
make a big difference in their phone bills. However, families on low or fixed in•
comes, particularly those who don't make long distance or zone calls, may feel that
the proposed increase is substantial.
On file with the Michigan Law Review.
54. Dozier letter at I. See also Letter from Hugh B. Anderson to student author,
May 22, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
55. Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 at 11 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Feb. 21, 1972),
Edison has appealed this order. No. 14214-C, (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, filed March 22,
1972).
The Commission declined to adjourn hearings on the rate case pending disposition
of the advertising charges, and instead assigned docket number U-4068 to the advertising
complaint. See Mich. Dept. of Commerce, News Service, Feb. 22, 1972, on file with the
Michigan Law Review.
56. See note 186 infra and accompanying text.
57. Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., March 30, 1972).
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its efforts on a suit filed against the Public Service Commission and
the Detroit Edison Company seeking invalidation of any Commission order in the Edison case that provides for the decreasing-cost
structure of utility rates presently used by Edison.58 The Consumer
Alliance seeks to open the Commission process to the general citizenry and put the concept of "public" back into the Public Service
Commission.59 It is difficult to determine whether the Consumer
Alliance seeks alteration of the judicial model under which the
Commission presently conducts rate cases or whether it is merely
angry with what it perceives is a pro-utility bias of the regulators.60
The plaintiffs, having been told by the Wayne County circuit
court to exhaust available administrative remedies, introduced direct
testimony in the Edison case regarding the need for nonpromotional
electric rates in Detroit Edison's domestic service classifications.61
Two months later the Public Service Commission granted Edison
interim rate relief of twenty-five million dollars but provided that
[t]he Domestic Rates are so structured that this interim increase has
no effect on the small or medium volume residential customer but
does affect the large volume customer, the larger the volume, the
greater the effect of the increase.62
The Commission utilized the testimony provided by the Consumer
Alliance of Michigan in reaching its determination on the rate
structure of the allowed interim increase. 63 Because of the implica58. Shavers v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., No. 195-719R (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, filed
Dec. IO, 1971). Because of the large economies of scale involved in utility operations, utilities operate on declining average cost curves. Under marginal cost pricing associated with welfare economic theory, utility prices would be set equal to
marginal costs. However, because of the downward sloping average total cost curves,
marginal cost is less than average total cost so that marginal pricing turns natural
monopolies into money losers. One possible solution to this problem is to permit a
utility to discriminate in price, thereby charging high unit prices for that part of demand that is inelastic and charging lower unit prices at higher levels of consumption
when the elasticity of demand is higher. Such promotional pricing has increased the
demand for utility companies and has only recently come under attack because of the
environmental and aggregate energy ramifications of such a pricing policy. See generally
L. WEISS, CASE STUDIES IN .AMERICAN INDUSTRY 88-144 (1971); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 519-23 (1971).
59. Conversation between V. Paul Donnelly, Attorney, Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Services (Counsel for the Consumer Alliance), and student author, Nov.
1971.
60. See Cooper, June 8, supra note 6, at 2-A, cols. 2-5.
61. J. Musial, Punuc UTILITIES AND PJl.lCE D1scruMINATION, Testimony and Exhibits
of J. Musial delivered in Support of Detroit Model Neighborhood Citizens and the
Consumer Alliance of Michigan, Jan. 19, 1972, before the Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. in
Detroit Edison Co., U-3910, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
62. Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 at 13 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., March 30, 1972).
63. Conversation betiveen John J. Musial, Head Social Planning Analyst, City Planning Commission, City of Detroit, and student author, May 6, 1972. See note 61 supra.

1378

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 70:1367

tions and possible ramifications of this rate structure modification64
it is clear that this citizens' group has had a significant impact on
Commission decision-making.
General consumer groups realistically can be expected to have
some input into the regulatory process. The history of the Edison
case and the reaction of the Commission to the pressures of investment bankers and utility interests65 indicate that the Commission is
not immune to outside criticism and pressure. However, the funding
uncertainties that frequently characterize consumer groups make it
unwise to depend on them for continuous and aggressive participation.66

5. Assessment of Contribution of Interoenors
The Detroit Free Press noted in 1971 that in comparison with
other industrial states, few outsiders take part in Michigan rate cases. 67
In the year since that article was written, the Public Service Commission has seen a dramatic rise in number and force of public
intervenors. In two areas the intervenors have been able to make
dramatically positive inputs into the regulatory scheme. The consideration presently being given by the Commission to the equity
of utility rate structures represents a new and potentially far-reaching
method of redistributing the burden of utility rate increases. It is
significant that the impetus for rate evaluation came not from the
Commission staff nor upon directive from the Commission, but
rather from the Consumer Alliance of Michigan and the UAW. In
the area of legislative reform, the UAW offers a welcome counterweight to the utility lobbies which until recently have been the only
major input at the legislative level. While it may not be within the
64. Commissioner Ralls observed that the interim order "marks the beginning of
efforts to reduce price discrimination" and noted that "the new rate increase design for
Detroit Edison's residential customers will mark the turning point in the development
of a pricing policy for electricity to meet the new economic and environmental problems
confronting the electric utilities today." U-3910 Order, supra note 62, at 4 (Commr. Ralls
concurring).
The progressive rate structure ordered for Edison applied only to the increase and
not to the over-all structure. Furthermore, the result of the order is merely to return
the rate structure to the relationship that existed in the early sixties before limited pr1ce
reductions were ordered for Detroit Edison. When those reductions were ordered, the
company successfully applied the lower rates to the high volume users thereby further•
ing discrimination in pricing. Conversation between Hugh B. Anderson and student
author, April 18, 1972.
65. A 1969 "newswire" release by a major investment firm urged its brokers to dis•
courage further investment in Michigan utilities because of the low rate of return allowed by the Commission. It has been suggested that the pressure resulting from this
release led the Commission to allow higher returns on common stock equity in subsequent rate cases. Cooper, June 7, supra note 6, at 1, cols. 3-8.
66. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadrned Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO, L.J. 525, 537-46 (197~).
67. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. 5,

Comments

June 1972]

1379

traditional parameters of "intervention" to so characterize the lobbying efforts of the UAW, an important void in the effective representation of the public interest is being filled.
The recent emergence of multiple public intervenors also reveals
the limitations of intervention. The utilities and some members of
the Commission have objected to the delay in rate hearings that is
caused by repetitive and uncoordinated examination of witnesses
and presentation of data by intervenors.68 These delays have resulted
in legislative proposals to allow the automatic implementation of
utility rate increases after a prescribed number of months even if
the Commission has not finished consideration of the rate petition.69
While the intervenors may regard all possible delay in the implementation of higher rates as a desired goal, ultimately the public interest
is furthered by the timely implementation of needed rate increases
which permit utility companies to provide the necessary services.
The form that public intervention has taken, namely attack on
broad regulatory policies such as the rate structure and the advertising policies of utilities, reveals also that the Commission staff plays
an indispensable role in the determination of utility rates. None of
the intervenors possess the funds or the expertise to determine independently the aggregate revenue requirements of major utility
companies. In the routine financial and technical aspects of rate
determination on which the substance of aggregate utility revenues
are based, the public will have to rely primarily on the Public Service Commission, through the Commission staff, to represent adequately the public interest in utility rate cases.
Ill.

DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRESENT PROCESS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Examination of the process by which utility rates are determined
in Michigan and discussions with the principal participants in the
process reveal specific areas in which the representation of the public
interest should be strengthened.

A. Presentation of the Staff Position in Commission Hearings
Although the Commission staff prepares the financial exhibits
and conducts the accounting and technical investigations on which
it bases its position, the formal briefs and actual presentation before
the Commission are made by an Assistant Attorney General operat68. During the hearings on S. 698, discussed in text accompanying notes 152-88 infra,
Commission Chairman Willis F. Ward expressed serious reservations concerning the
effectiveness of the Attorney General's intervention as well as concern that such intervention has unduly extended the length of the hearings. Statement by Commissioner
Ward, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
69. See note 153 infra.
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ing out of the Public Service Division of the Attorney General's
office. While the staff is comprised largely of engineers and accountants with a career specialization in utility regulation,70 the attorneys
assigned to the Public Service Division of the Attorney General's
office have no similar commitment to specialization in the regulatory
field. During the past fifteen years, twelve different attorneys have
been assigned to the Public Service Division. Of the ten attorneys
who have subsequently left, four have entered private practice, five
have been transferred to other divisions within the Attorney General's office, and one is presently on leave of absence.71
Because of the complexity of rate cases, it takes a substantial
period of time before attorneys assigned to the Public Service Division become conversant in utility matters and are able to present
adequately the staff position in Commission hearings.72 The presentation of the staff case by inexperienced attorneys general is an impediment to the optimal representation of the public interest.73
In order to alleviate the problem caused by attorney turnover, the
Commission should be permitted to employ a full-time attorney who
would work with the staff in the preparation and presentation of the
staff position in rate cases. Present statutory authority to appoint the
staff "necessary for the proper exercise of the powers and duties of
the commission" 74 seems to embrace the retention of full-time
counsel. Moreover, potential conflict with the duty of the Attorney
General to provide the legal advice required by state departments
and to act as legal counsel for state agencies may be minimized by
limiting the staff attorney to activities connected with rate cases or
other intra-agency proceedings.'15 The retention of counsel by a regu70. Letter from Tom Hancock, Director, Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division,
to student author, March 7, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
71. Letter from Robert J. Taube, Assistant Attorney General, to student author,
Feb. 7, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
72. The problem of attorney turnover and friction between staff members and inexperienced attorneys has been noted in the context of rate proceedings in the FPC.
See Cramton, THE CONDUCf OF RATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,
Rfil><>RT OF A STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMllTEE REPORTER OF THE ADllUNISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMllTEE ON RULEMAKING 33, 52 (1962).
73. But see letter from Hugh Anderson to student author, March 2, 1972, at 2 [here•
inafter Anderson letter, March 2], on file with the Michigan Law Review, where it is
suggested that the turnover in the Public Service Division is not detrimental to the
Commission because of the training period allowed newly assigned attorneys. Mr. An•
derson notes that "at no time during the last 15 years • • • has the Commission ever
been forced to rely upon an attorney with no previous public utility experience," Id.
at 2.
74. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.3 (1967).
75. Assistant Attorney General Anderson notes that while there may be no consti•
tutional objection to the employment of an attorney to represent the staff, "when it
comes to representing the Commission in court, the position of this office for many
years ••• has been that under the [Michigan] Constitution only the Attorney General
has the right to speak for the State and its agencies." Anderson letter, March 2, srtpra
note 73, at 2.
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latory commission has precedent in the regulatory scheme of other
states76 and would provide a solution to the high turnover that presently characterizes legal counsel available to the Commission.
A competing consideration, however, should be noted. Assistant
Attorneys General are, of course, ultimately responsible to the Attorney General. By virtue of their independence from the Public
Service Commission for promotions, recommendations, and assignments, they are "in a position to serve as intermediaries from the
staff, to the Commission, and as a buffer between the Commission
and staff."77 It has been argued that counsel appointed by the Attorney General is better able to exercise independent judgment than
counsel retained by a regulatory commission.78 These considerations
have merit, but the increased legal expertise in utility matters obtainable through permanent staff counsel is of higher priority. While
it would be possible for the Attorney General to make a commitment
to employ and retain utility specialists in the Public Service Division,
the more certain course is to institutionalize the utility attorney in
the context of employment by the Public Service Commission.
B.

The Legal and Practical Status of the
Commission Staff

Although it is generally acknowledged by the Commission that
its operations are "quasi-judicial in nature," 79 the precise relationship between the staff and the Commission is not clearly defined in
the Administrative Procedures Act, in the Commission's own Rules
of Practice and Procedure, or by statute. While the Commission regards the staff as a "party" to a rate case, the failure to define the
status of the staff in more precise terms has led to uncertainty regarding staff powers and rights. As a result, the staff occupies the
76. The Wisconsin experience is illustrative. William E. Torkelson has served as
Chief Counsel of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission since 1949. Wisconsin Commissioner Arthur L. Padrutt believes that "effective regulation of public utilities in
the public interest is much enhanced where a commission is able to retain its own
counsel." Letter from Arthur L. Padrutt, Commissioner, Wis. Pub. Serv. Commn., to
student author, March 20, 1972, at 3, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
77. Letter from Hugh B. Anderson to student author, May 22, 1972, on file with the
Michigan Law Review.
78. See comments by Joseph I. Lewis, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission, 1961 Convention of the National Association of R.R. and Utilities Commissioners, Workshop on Public Utility Law, Sept. 28, 1961, at 554-60, on file with the
Michigan Law Review.
79. Memorandum from Dept. of Commerce to Governor Milliken (Pub. Serv.
Commn. Analysis of S. 980), July 23, 1971, at 2 [hereinafter Analysis S. 980]. The analysis was prepared by Commission Chairman Ward. When a bill is introduced in the
Michigan legislature that would affect a state department if it were passed, the department prepares an analysis of the bill which states the department's official position
toward the bill. An analysis is often quite revealing since it states not only an official
policy position but also frequently reveals the agency's conception of its role and duties
to the public.
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uncomfortable position of representing the public interest in Commission hearings without rights equal to those of other parties to the
proceedings.
A rate case completed in 1971 illustrates the difficulty with the
present concept of staff rights. The General Telephone CompanyBo
had applied for a rate increase in 1970, and the case had been assigned to a hearing examiner to receive testimony and recommend
a proposal for decision.Bl Use of a hearing examiner is expressly
authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act, 82 and the role of
the hearing examiner in the Michigan regulatory process has been
expanded during the recent period of numerous rate petitions. The
Act provides that the examiner's proposal for decision shall become
the decision of the Commission unless exceptions are filed by a party
adversely affected or the Commission initiates its own review.Ba
In the hearings before Examiner Alfred Sullivan, the staff concentrated its case on the purchases that the General Telephone Company had made from the Automatic Electric Company.B4 Both the
General Telephone Company and the Automatic Electric Company
are wholly owned subsidiaries of the General Telephone & Electronics Corporation,85 and the staff argued that in determining the
reasonableness of the prices charged by Automatic the only proper
approach would be to "set a fair rate of return on common equity to
be earned by Automatic Electric.'' 86 The hearing examiner rejected
80. See Troxel, Telephone Regulation in Michigan, in UTILITY R.EcuLAnoN 141,
145-56 (W. G. Shepherd & T. G. Gies ed. 1966).
81. General Telephone Co., U-3798, Proposal for Decision, at 1 Oune 29, 1971), on
file with the Michigan Law Review,
82. MICH, COMP. LAws .ANN. § 24.279-281 (Supp. 1972). The Public Service Com•
mission desires that "eventually all hearings be conducted by hearing e.xaminers, in•
eluding all rate matters" and has sought an increase in the number of hearing examin•
ers from three to five in fiscal 1972. MICH. Ptra. SERV. Co11n.rn., Budgetary Request, on
file with the Michigan Law Review. Hearing Examiner Alfred A. Sullivan reports that
Michigan has lagged far behind other industrial states in providing a substantial force
of hearing examiners. Conversation between Examiner Sullivan and student author,
April 18, 1972.
83. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.281(3) (Supp. 1972).
84. Brief of the Commission Staff at 3-8, General Telephone Co., U-3798 [hereinafter Commission brief].
85. General Telephone Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 228, 230 (l\:lich, Pub. Serv. Commn,, 1971).
86. Commission brief, supra note 84, at 6. In the recently completed Michigan Bell
case, Commissioner Ralls similarly argued that "the commission must treat both children
of AT&T equally, particularly when all the treats go home to the same parent." Michi•
gan Bell Telephone Co., U-3838, Opinion and Order of Mich, Pub. Serv, Commn., at
8-9 (April 28, 1972) (dissenting opinion). The proper method of valuing equipment
purchases from a commonly owned subsidiary has long been a perplexing regulatory
issue. See Invin, The Communications Industry, in THE STRUCTIJRE OF AMERICAN IN•
nusmY 404-06 (W. Adams ed., 4th ed. 1971). The California Public Utilities Commission
has pursued the theory advocated by the Michigan Commission staff in the General
Telephone case, but there are indications that the California Commission is reversing its
stand. Lawson, supra note 4, at 22, col. 3. The California supreme court has recently
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the staff's arguments and computed the rate base by using the actual
prices paid by General Telephone87 since evidence had been offered
that the prices charged "were identical to or lower than the prices
charged to .•. nonaffiliated companies." 88 Despite the rejection of
its position, the Commission staff did not file an exception to the
examiner's ruling. The failure to do so may be attributed to the
uncertainty regarding staff rights to file exceptions which had been
created by the then recently enacted Administrative Procedures Act.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the right to file exceptions is granted only to "a party to the proceeding other than the
agency itself."89 This seems to preclude the filing of exceptions by
the staff. Even though the staff is regarded as an adversary party in
the context of a rate case, there is no support for the proposition that
it should be considered anything other than a part of the Commission for purposes of the prohibitory clause of the Act. The staff is
certainly part of the Commission under the statutory framework of
the Commission's authority. Obviously, to the extent that the staff
is viewed merely as an arm of the Commission it is anomalous to
allow it to file exceptions since it results in an agency challenging
itself.00 But since the judicial model contemplates the staff as an
adversary party with corresponding rights, to deny the staff full rights
will prevent Commission consideration of potentially important
questions that arise before hearing examiners and are resolved adversely to the public. Because the Commission intends to expand the
role of hearing examiners so that all hearings eventually will be
conducted by examiners,91 the lack of staff authority to file exceptions
will take on increasing importance.
The Administrative Procedures Act presently provides a route
by which staff dissatisfaction with an examiner's decision may be
communicated to the Commission. Although the Administrative
Procedures Act generally prohibits communication between the
agency decision-makers and the agency staff engaged in investigation
and preparation of a given case during the pendency of that proceedannulled the Commission's order, relying in part on the failure to make an adjustment
for purchases from a commonly owned subsidiary. See City of Los Angeles v. Public
Utilities Commission, - Cal. 3d -, 497 P.2d 785, 793-96, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 321-24
(1972).
87. 90 P.U.R.3d at 231.
88. Commission Brief, supra note 84, at 5.
89. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. § 24.281(1) (Supp. 1972).
90. It is also not clear that the staff would qualify as a "party" under section 5 of
the Administrative Procedures Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.205(3) (Supp. 1972),
even if it were regarded as separate from the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission's own rules provide no support for concluding that the Commission staff is intended to be afforded party status. See MICH. ADMIN, C.R. 460.ll(c) &: .17 (Supp. 1968).
91. See note 82 supra.
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ing,92 the recent "Hancock Amendment" of the section specifically
exempts the Public Service Commission from that prohibition.03
While this safety valve, coupled with the Commission's right to reopen an examiner's proposal for decision to full Commission review,
may compensate for the staff's inability to file exceptions, it does so
only at the expense of detraction from the Commission's avowed
adherence to the judicial model. Ex parte communications between
the staff and the Commission regarding the specifics of a rate case
should be discouraged. 94 As the Commission staff increases in size,
the rationale of the "Hancock Amendment" no longer exists; 0u
that amendment should be repealed to restore the prohibition of
communication between the staff and the Commission during rate
cases. In its place, the staff should be given the statutory right to file
exceptions to examiner proposals for decision. Considering the expanded role destined for hearing examiners in Michigan, ultimate
resort to the full Commission by the staff should be institutionally
protected.
An additional result of the failure to delineate precisely the
powers of the staff is the inability of the staff to seek judicial review
of Commission rulings. The Administrative Procedures Act provides
92, MICH, COMP, LAws ANN.§ 24.282 (Supp. 1972).
93. Mica. COMP, LAws ANN, § 24.282 (Supp. 1972).
94. Off-the-record communications should also be prohibited because they could be
used by the Commission or individual commissioners to influence the arguments made
by the staff in rate cases. This raises the question whether separation of the staff from
dependence upon the Commission might strengthen the regulatory process by eliminating even the possibility of interference by the Commission in the development of substantive issues by the staff. Such a separation would more fully effectuate the Commission's judicial model by creating a staff that was in every sense a "party" to rate proceedings. Such a proposal is likely to be counterproductive, however, because it overlooks the wide range of activities presently performed by the staff that assists the
Commission. Creation of a separate staff unit to consider rate cases would not obviate
the necessity of a staff unit assigned to the Commission with responsibility for other
necessary elements of utility regulation such as field work inspections, investigation of
consumer complaints, and utility audits on a rotating basis. See generally Cramton,
supra note 30, at 278-80. Perhaps more importantly, the Commission contemplates
greater involvement in regulatory areas where the judicial model is inapplicable, and
will require a large technical staff in order to evaluate investigations that arc not part
of adversary proceedings. For example, in connection with the recent Detroit Edison
case, the Commission ordered the company to submit a ten-year "comprehensive
report" of projected load growth, power generation capacity, and pollution abatement
plans. See Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm., March 30, &: April 10,
1972) (Interim Rate Order &: Amendment to Interim Rate Order). See also note 64
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, any attempt to isolate the staff from the
Commission at the present time must be tempered by the realization that increasing
the independence of the staff is likely to have the additional result of depriving the
Commission of its staff at the moment of its greatest need.
95. Tom Hancock, Director, Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division of the
Commission, believes that the purpose of the amendment "was to ease the difficulty for
a Commission having a relatively small technical staff." Mr. Hancock was not a party
to the discussions that led to the amendment. Letter from Tom Hancock to student
author, March 7, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
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for judicial review only for "person[s] ... aggrieved by a final decision or order"96 and yet defines "persons" so as to exclude the agency
engaged in the particular case.97 Therefore, while utility companies
may appeal Commission rulings, and have done so frequently, 98 the
staff is denied rights of appeal because of its relationship to the Commission-even though it is regarded as an adversary party with the
duty of representing the public interest in rate proceedings before
the Commission. Providing staff access to judicial review, however,
runs into practical and theoretical difficulties. Even if the staff were
permitted to retain an attorney for intra-agency counsel, the Attorney
General would object strongly to any attempt to broaden the duties
of the staff attorney to include representation of the staff in judicial
proceedings. Absent such an extension, any judicial challenge by
the staff would find the Attorney General counseling the opposing
parties.0° Furthermore, since the staff members are still ultimately
dependent upon the Commissioners for assignments and advancement, there is a practical incentive for the staff to avoid direct challenge of Commission rulings.
Staff right to judicial review of Commission rulings is less compelling than the right to file exceptions. The right to file exceptions
is necessary to assure that the persons with the statutory duty to regulate utility rates, namely the Commissioners, do not abdicate their
responsibility to hearing examiners. But when the Commission itself
has made the decision, the statutory command has been fulfilled.
The Public Service Commission will find it useful to consider the
operations of other regulatory commissions which do permit judicial
review for both parties to proceedings,100 but absent demonstration
96. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 24.301 (Supp. 1972). While that section provides the
right to review, the mechanics of review are provided in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 462.26 (1967). Although that statute, originally applicable to the old Railroad ComInission, refers to common carriers, MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.4 (1967) applies it to
Public Service Commission orders as well.
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 24.205(4) (Supp. 1972). An important distinction must
be drawn between the right of an agency to seek judicial review when its decision has
been reversed by a lower court, and the situation presently under discussion, namely
the ~ght of a component of an agency to seek judicial review not of a court decision,
but rather of the administrative decision itself. In the former situation, judicial review
has been permitted in Michigan despite the prevailing view that the term "person
aggrieved" does not include bodies acting in the name of the state. Compare General
Telephone Co. of Michigan v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 341 Mich. 620, 67 N.W.2d 822 (1954)
with Davis, Standing of a Public Official To Challenge Agency Decisions: A Unique
Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 AD. L. REv. 163, 176-77 (1964).
98. E.g., General Telephone Co. of Michigan v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 341 Mich. 620,
67 N.W.2d 882 (1954); Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 25 Mich.
App. 512, 181 N.W.2d 596, leave to appeal granted, 384 Mich. 783 (1970).
99. Compare note 75 supra with Sax &: Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1003, 1022 n.82 (1972).
100. Maryland provides for the appointment of a People's Counsel who may retain
experts, have full access to commission records and staff, and appear before the Commission in any matter or proceeding "in which he may deem the public interest to be

1386

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:lll67

of a more compelling need, the right to judicial review by the Commission staff is not essential.
C. Funding the Regulators
Of all the barriers to adequate representation of the public interest in rate proceedings, none is more formidable than the inadequacy of funds available to the Commission and its staff. The Detroit
Free Press study found that some states regulating comparable utility
operations had larger regulatory staffs than the Michigan Public Service Commission.101 Under orders from Michigan Governor William
G. Milliken,102 the Administrative Section of the Public Service
Commission has attempted to estimate the allocation of the Commission's budget for fiscal 1971 according to function performed.
The Program Budget Evaluation System reveals that approximately
544 thousand dollars of the Commission budget will be devoted to
the regulation of utility rates.103 When the resources available to the
staff are compared with the expenditures that have been made by the
state's major utilities in connection with rate cases, the result is very
plainly what the Detroit Free Press characterized as an "unequal
contest."104 In connection with a single 1970 rate case10G in which
Detroit Edison sought a forty-eight million dollar increase, the company reportedly spent 660 thousand dollars.106
The statutory provisions relating to the funding of the Public
Service Commission are, like those delineating the Commission's
authority,107 a conglomeration of statutes passed at different times
to govern the Public Service Commission, the Public Utilities Cominvolved ••••" Mo. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 15 (1969). The People's Counsel is given the
right to judicial review. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 90 (Supp. 1971).
101. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, cols. 5-8. See also FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE
COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION 44 (1967). FPC figures reveal that the following states have larger professional staffs than the Michigan Public Service Commission:
California, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The following states
maintain a larger "total staff" than Michigan: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
102. See 1971-1 ExECUTIVE DIRECTIVE, February 16, 1971, from Governor William G.
Milliken to Principal Department Heads, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
103. Conversations between :Bert Schafer, Supervisor, Administrative Section, Public
Utilities Division, and student author, Feb. 3, 1972 &: April 18, 1972. The proposed
budget for fiscal 1972 would increase the resources devoted to rate regulation to 710
thousand dollars but is based on the assumption that S. 698, discussed in notes 152-89
infra and accompanying text, is passed.
104. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. 5.
105. Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 463 (Mich. Pub. Scrv. Commn., 1970).
106. Documentation of Edison expenditures is provided in Detroit Edison Co,,
U-3697, Order of Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Exhibit I-50 (April 22, 1970), on file with
the Michigan Law Rwiew. See also Anderson letter, Feb, 15, supra note 38, at 4,
107. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
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mission,108 and the Railroad Commission.100 Although granted wide
authority to appoint a staff "as shall be necessary for the proper
exercise of the powers and duties of the commission,"110 the Commission ultimately depends on the annual state appropriation as the
source of spending authority. Until the recent plethora of rate cases,
the Commission was an agency of low visibility and consequently
did not rate high in the hierarchy of appropriations priorities. Although the Commission now receives substantial public scrutiny and
interest, the State of Michigan is having difficulty balancing its
budget and the resulting squeeze has been felt by all state departments.111
The "Expenses of Audit or Appraisal" statute passed originally
for the Public Utilities Commission affords a mechanism by which
the Public Service Commission may escape its financial straitjacket.112
Passed in 1921, the statute is still basically operative in its original
form.113 This statute has been the target of a number of current
legislative amendments directed toward providing a more equitable
funding allocation for the staff and even raising the possibility of
forcing utility companies to pay the expenses incurred by intervenors. Two important issues are raised by the present statutes and
the attempts to amend them: (I) What is the scope of staff activities
that may be presently and properly charged to the utility companies,
and (2) does an expansion of the scope of permissible charges equal108.
109.
110.
111.
by 3%.
112.
113.

MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967).
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 (1967).
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.3 (1967).
Departments were told to expect an order to cut back expenses in fiscal 1971
Conversation with Bert Schafer, supra note 103.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967).
The statute, MICH. Cor.n>. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967), provides:

460.401 Expenses of audit or appraisal by utilities
commission; account
Sec. 1. Whenever the Michigan public utilities commission finds it to be necessary to audit the books and records, or to appraise the plants, properties or facilities
of any telephone, gas, electric light, and power, electric railway, water, heat or any
other public utility under the jurisdiction of said commission for rate making,
capitalization, or any other purpose, it shall have the right to make such audit and
appraisal through its accounting, engineering and other forces, and shall keep an
accurate, detailed account of all moneys expended and expenses incurred by said
commission in and about such audit and appraisal.
460.402 Same; payment
Sec. 2. From time to time during the progress of the audit and appraisal, or
at the conclusion of the same, said commission shall render to the utility in question, statements showing the amounts of money expended in such work, which
expense shall be paid by such utility into the state treasury at such times and in
such manner as the commission may by order require.
460.403 Audit or appraisal; disposition of receipts for expenses
Sec. 3. All moneys paid into the state treasury by arty public utility uµ.der the
provisions of this act shall be credited to the general fund.
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ize the funds available to the staff and discourage unnecessary company expenditures?
·
A majority of states require that a portion or all of the costs of
regulation of utilities be provided by special fees or assessments paid
by the utility companies being regulated.114 The rationale for such
provisions is appealing. When a utility company pays the costs of
regulation, the expenditures increase its cost of service and, accordingly, constitute proper items in the calculation of allowable utility
rates. Since the costs of regulation are eventually reflected in the level
of utility rates approved by the Commission, the utility customers
ultimately bear these costs. Therefore, the beneficiaries of the regulatory process-the rate-paying customers-underwrite the costs of
regulation.115
In 1965 the Public Service Commission requested an interpretation of the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal statute116 from the Attorney General.117 In connection with that request, the Commission
staff prepared a memorandum summarizing its interpretation of the
statute and the precise activities for which expenses were being
assessed. Although that formal interpretation was never issued, there
are indications that the file has remained active, and the Commission
has renewed its request.118
The staff memorandum119 indicates that field and office work in
connection with formal rate proceedings are ordinarily charged to
the appropriate utility. Except for additional work unconnected with
formal rate cases but nevertheless financially oriented (such as original cost audits, reviews of depreciation studies, and inventories of
property), the staff has not attempted to charge expenses to utilities.120 The staff and the Commission are of the opinion that any
114. FPC, supra note 101, at 45-46.
115. Compare with a letter from Richard Guregian, Director of Ta.xes, Real Estate
and Diversification, Detroit, Toledo &: Ironton Railroad Co., to State Senator Harry A.
DeMaso, Feb. 9, 1972, at I [hereinafter Guregian letter]:
The Public Service Commission was established as the "watchdog" over public
utilities and to protect (?) the public's interest. It should logically follow that the
public at large (of which the utilities are a member) should undenvritc the cost,
The utilities are liable for all the same taxes to which other business entities arc
subject and bear their share of the economic burden of providing government and
are, therefore, paying their share of the cost of being regulated.
On file with the Michigan Law Review.
116. MICH. COl',IP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967).
117. Letter from Peter B. Spivak, Chairman, Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., to Frank J,
Kelley, Attorney General, June 8, 1965, on file with the Michigan Law Review,
118. Conversation between William R. Ralls, Commr., Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn,,
and student author, Feb. 15, 1972.
119. Memorandum from F. M. Hoppe, Director of Public Utilities, to the Mich,
Pub. Serv. Commn., Public Utilities Division and Charges to Public Utilities, June 8,
1965 (hereinafter Staff Memo], on file with the Michigan Law Review.
120. Id. at 2-5. No charge is made for investigation of complaints, safety checks, field
checks of construction and operation of gas facilities, general studies of a utility industry, negotiation to reduce customer rates, and/or continuing checks to determine utility
compliance with regulations and rules of the Commission,
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attempt to broaden the assessments into other areas such as investigation of customer complaints, compliance with safety codes, or Commission studies of particular utility industries might lead to company
demands for formal hearings that could effectively bring regulation
to a "standstill."121 In the fiscal years ending in 1970 and 1971 the
Commission assessed the state's utilities a total of 306,549 dollars.122
Section 1 of the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal provision123 is
capable of a broader reading, principally because of the ambiguity
of the word "appraisal." The term may have been intended in its
evaluative sense which would permit, for example, Commissionsponsored studies of utility industries or pollution abatement. Coupled with the use of the term "audit" in the statute, however, appraisal is probably intended in its financial sense to embrace valuation of utility property and depreciation studies. The Commission's
interpretation of the statute as not authorizing assessments for customer complaint investigation, safety-code compliance checks, and
the above-mentioned industry-wide studies is consistent with the
probable legislative intent. Therefore, although Commission authority to assess expenses is not limited to expenses related solely to
formal rate proceedings, it clearly does not embrace the entire scope
of regulatory work conducted by the staff. Perhaps more importantly,
there is no mechanism in the assessment statutes that serves to discourage exorbitant company expenditures in connection with rate
cases; in fact, the opposite may be true: knowing that the staff has
only limited access to funds and resources, a utility company has an
incentive to "overkill" in the retention of experts and specialists to
convince the Commission of the need for rate increases.
No authority presently exists by which the utility companies may
be compelled to pay expenses incurred by any person or group other
than the Public Service Commission. Costs of investigations undertaken by intervenors, including the Attorney General, must be paid
by the intervenors themselves.
Given the Commission's interpretation of the Expenses of Audit
121. Id. at 1; Spivak letter, supra note 117, at 1. The Commission's fear may be
unwarranted; see text accompanying notes 169-87 infra.
122. Aggregate expenses charged to utility companies over the past five years:
Fiscal Year
Ending 6/30

Pub. Serv. Commn.
Employees

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

$ 36,052

52,901
38,903
126,963
138,811

Contractual

Total
$ 36,052

$ 18,831

21,571
19,204

52,901
57,734
148,534
158,015

Source of data: Letter from Commissioner William R. Ralls to student author, March
16, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review.
123,

MICH, COMP. LAWS

ANN. § 460.401 (1967).
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or Appraisal statute,124 it is important and appropriate to consider
two bills pending in the Michigan legislature that would substantially alter the scope and method of funding Commission activities.
I. Senate Bill 980

S. 980 was introduced in July 1971 and would amend the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal statute,126 discussed above, by providing
that the Commission shall have the right to "make economic or
:financial studies"127 of any utility under its jurisdiction in addition
to retaining its authority to make audits and appraisals of utility
125

124. Mica. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967).
125. S. 980, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). The bill would amend MICH, ColllP,
I.Aws ANN.§§ 460.401-.402, set forth in note 113 supra, to read as below, The capitalized
words presently do not appear in §§ 460.401-.402 but would be added by the new bill,
For the deletions in §§ 460.401-.402 proposed by S. 980, compare note 113 supra.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
Section I. Sections 1 and 2 of Act No. 47 of the Public Acts of 1921, being sec•
tions 460.401 and 460.402 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, are amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 1. (I) Whenever the public SERVICE commission finds it to be necessary to
audit the books and records, or to appraise the plants, properties or facilities, OR
MAKE ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL STUDIBS of any telephone, gas, electric
light and power, electric railway, water, heat or any other public utility under the
jurisdiction of THE commission for rate making, capitalization or any other pur•
pose, it shall have the right to make THE audit, appraisal OR STUDY through its
accounting, ECONOMIC engineering OR other forces EMPLOYED OR RE·
TAINED BY IT. THE COMMISSION shall keep an accurate, detailed account
of all FEES PAID, moneys expended and c.xpenses incuned in THE audit, ap•
praisal OR STUDY.
(2) UPON AUTHORIZATION OF THE COMMISSION, AN INTERVENING
PARTY MAY EMPLOY ENGINEERS, ACCOUNTANTS, ECONOMISTS AND
OTHER NECESSARY PERSONS TO AUDIT, APPRAISE AND ANALYZE THE
BOOKS, RECORDS, STATISTICS AND FACILITIES OF A PUBLIC UTILITY
COMPANY, AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE COMMISSION IN A
PROCEEDING INVOLVING THE RATES OR SERVICES OF THE UTILITY
COMPANY.
(3) AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 1/20 OF 1% OF THE GROSS UTILITY REV•
ENUES OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANY BEING INVESTIGATED,
BASED UPON THE COMPANY'S REVENUES FOR THE CALENDAR OR
FISCAL YEAR LAST COMPLETED, SHALL BE AVAILABLE FOR USE OF
THE COMMISSION AND AUTHORIZED INTERVENERS AS PROVIDED IN
THIS ACT.
Sec. 2. From time to time during the progress OR AT THE CONCLUSION of
the audit, appraisal, STUDY OR TESTIMONY, THE commission OR AUTHOR·
IZED INTERVENERS shall render to the utility in question, statements showing
the amounts of money expended in THE work. IN THE CASE OF COMMISSION
EXPENSES, PAYMENT shall be MADE by THE utility into the state treasury,
AND IN THE CASE OF THE EXPENSES OF AUTHORIZED INTERVENERS,
DIRECTLY TO THE ACCOUNTANTS, ENGINEERS, ECONOMISTS OR
OTHER PERSONS EMPLOYED BY THE INTERVENERS, at THE times and in
THE manner as the commission may by order require. IF A UTILITY HAS ANY
OBJECTION TO THE NECESSITY OR AMOUNT OF THE EXPENSES, IT
SHALL FILE ITS OBJECTIONS WITH THE COMMISSION WITHIN 30
DAYS AFTER BEING PRESENTED WITH THE STATEMENT OF EXPENSES,
AND THE COMMISSION SHALL PROMPTLY HOLD A HEARING ON THE
OBJECTIONS.
126. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967).
127. S. 980, § 1(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971).
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records and facilities. The bill specifies that these audits, appraisals,
or studies may be made by personnel "employed or retained by" 128
the Commission. Senator Plawecki, a co-sponsor of the bill, believes
that the Commission has been hesitant to retain outside experts in
connection with rate proceedings because of the uncertain authority
provided by section I 129 of the current Expenses of Audit or Appraisal statute.13°Feeling that the retention of outside experts would
strengthen the presentation of the staff's case in Commission proceedings, he also notes that the use of experts would give staff members additional time to pursue their regular duties since they would
not be called upon to testify in numerous hearings.131 While the
sponsors' theories regarding the benefits from greater reliance on
specialists in rate cases appear sound, the bill would merely confirm
the authority that the Commission presently exercises.132
However, to the extent that the Commission contemplates resorting to outside experts in connection with environmental matters or
utility industry studies, S. 980 would release the Commission from
having to justify assessments in terms of "audits" or "appraisals" as
is presently required.133 Therefore, despite the fact that the bill was
designed to make experts accessible for rate case purposes, the
broader impact of the bill would be to allow the Commission to
retain experts to do the precise kinds of investigations and analyses
that the Commission will require in subsequent years.
S. 980 also attempts to solve the very difficult problem of securing
adequate funds for intervenors, thereby providing for broadened
public participation in rate proceedings. Upon authorization by the
Commission, an intervenor would be permitted to employ specialists
to present evidence in Commission proceedings. The bill provides
that an amount equal to one-t\\Tentieth of one per cent of the gross
utility revenues of the company being investigated would be available to the authorized intervenors and the Commission.134 Although
payments for Commission expenditures would continue to be made
directly to the state treasury under section 2 of the proposed bil1136
and credited to the general fund under section 3 of the current Expenses of Audit or Appraisal statute,136 payments would be made
128. S. 980, § 1(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971).
129. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.401 (1967).
130. Conversation between State Senator David Plawecki and student author, Feb.
3, 1972.
131. Id.
132. In recent years, the Commission has retained outside specialists and assessed
the utility companies for those expenses. See note 122 supra.
133. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.401 (1967).
134. S. 980, § 1(3), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971).
135. S. 980, § 2, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971).
136. MICH. Coi.IP. LAws ANN. § 460.403 (1967).
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directly to the experts employed by the intervenors under the proposed legislation.1a1
The Public Service Commission opposes S. 980.138 The bill not
only imposes a ceiling of one-twentieth of one per cent of gross utility
revenues, but it also provides that the ceiling shall apply to the sum
of the charges assessable by the intervenor and the Commission.130
Despite the fact that the bill vests the Commission with the ultimate
authority to regulate the level of intervenor spending, the imposition
of a fl.at percentage ceiling on the amount that may be assessed
constitutes a restriction not presently found in the statute. The
percentage ceiling, as a function of a company's revenues, might be
inadequate to cover the expenses related to small and medium-sized
utilities.140 The ceiling also fails to offer any incentive for reduced
company expenditures in connection with rate cases. Application of
the ceiling to Detroit Edison would limit assessments to about 250
thousand dollars,141 which £alls far short of the sums that Edison has
spent in recent rate cases.142 The Commission opposes any bill that
contemplates funding intervenors unless such funding provisions are
"entirely separate and apart from any statute funding operation of
the Commission and its staff." 148 This position is sound.
Intervenors can and do have an impact on the regulatory process. The City of Detroit and the UAW have successfully challenged
utility advertising policies.144 The Consumer Alliance suit and its
presentation of expert testimony145 on the structure of utility rates
has already had an impact on Commission decision-making. Intervention by environmental groups has led to settlement of disputes
arising from the construction of a nuclear power plant by Consumers
Power Company.146 All of these developments indicate that there is
a valuable contribution that intervenors can make in the rate determination process in Michigan as a supplement to the Commission
staff. The uncertainty of funding for intervenors, however, offers a
serious challenge to their ability to provide this valuable contribution;
but there are methods available to finance intervenors without dilut137. S. 980 § 2, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971).
138. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 2.
139. S. 980, § 1(3), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971),
140. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 2.
141. This calculation was made by talcing one twentieth of one per cent of 518,632,·
000 dollars, Detroit Edison's total electric revenues for 1969. 1970 DETROIT EDISON Co•
.ANN. REP.
142. See text accompanying note 106 infra.
143. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 3.
144. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
145. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text,
146. Palisades Plant Settlement Agreement between Intervenors and Consumers
Power Co., No. 50-255 (A.E.C., March 12, 1971), on file with the Environmental Law
Society, University of Michigan.
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ing the resources available to the Commission staff.147 The principle
of S. 980, namely Commission authorization of intervenor expenditures and subsequent assessment of utility companies, is certainly
a plausible method. Since expenses paid by the utility companies will
ultimately be passed along in the form of higher utility rates, there
is no drain on the utilities, absent abnormal regulatory lag.148 Although the Public Service Commission opposes S. 980 because it
might encourage an "extreme degree of intervention,"149 the Commission could control the number of intervenors and the level of
permissible expenditures. The deficiency of S. 980 in its present form
is not that it provides funding for intervenors, but rather that it does
so only at the expense of the Commission staff.159
Most significantly, S. 980 fails to modify the Commission's dependence on the annual appropriations by the legislature. The
Commission's powers to appoint the necessary staff are rendered impotent by the present reliance on the legislature. Even the Commission expenditures that impose no drain on the state treasury-those
expenses that are assessed to the utility companies-are not within
the control of the Commission because the funds are deposited in the
general fund of the state treasury.151 This leaves the utility companies
with the continued incentive to spend lavishly in preparation of rate
cases and to lobby to keep the annual appropriation to the Public
Service Commission minimal.
Despite the welcome expansion of the scope of assessable charges
that S. 980 provides, passage in its present form might prove detrimental to the public interest.

2. Senate Bill 698
Recently passed by the Michigan Senate is a bill that was introduced at the request of the Public Service Commission,152 and has
147. See Cramton, supra note 66, at 54046.
148. See note 153 infra.
149. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 2.
150, The issue of adequacy of funding for public interest intervenors is the primary
hurdle currently preventing strong public interest representation. "[T)he leaders of the
public interest movement, having won the early battles to secure the right to intervene,
have discovered that some harsh economic realities threaten to make these early victories empty ones." Cramton, supra note 66, at 526. S. 980, by raising the possibility of
utility payment of intervenor expenses, raises a potentially far-reaching solution which
merits independent analysis.
151. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.403 (1967).
152. Memoranda from Dept. of Commerce to Governor Milliken (Pub. Serv. Commn.
Analysis of S. 698), June 21, 1971 [hereinafter Analysis S. 698, June 21, 1971] &: March
14, 1972. S. 698, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972), as amended and passed by the Senate
on June 1, 1972 [hereinafter S. 698) provides:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT:
Sec. 1. As used in this act:
(a) "Commission" means the public service commission.
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(b) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(c) "Puolic utility" means a steam, heat, electric, power, gas, water, telephone,
telegraph, communications, pipeline or gas producing company regulated oy the
commission, whether private, corporate or cooperative, except a municipally owned
utility.
Sec. 2. (1) The department within 30 days after the enactment into law of any
appropriation to it, shall ascertain the amount of the appropriation attributable
to the regulation of public utilities. This amount shall be assessed against the public
utilities and shall be apportioned amongst them as follows: the gross revenue for
the preceding calendar year derived from intrastate operations for each public
utility shall be totaled and each public utility shall pay a portion of the assessment
in the same proportion that its gross revenue for the preceding calendar year
derived from intrastate operations bears to such total. Each public utility shall
pay a minimum assessment of not less than $50.00.
Sec. 3. For the fiscal year commencing July I, 1973 and annually thereafter,
there shall be deducted from any amount to be assessed under section 2 an amount
equal to the difference by which the actual ex:eenditures for the previous fiscal year
attributable to the regulation of public utilities are less than the amounts appro•
priated for those purposes, Such deductions shall be made in the same proportion as
the original assessments in section 2 of the act.
Sec. 4. For the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1972 and annually thereafter, each
public utility shall be allowed a credit, not to exceed the amount of the assessment,
for any fees paid during the previous fiscal year under Act No. 419 of the Public
Acts of 1919, as amended, being sections 460.51 to 460.62 of the Compiled Laws of
1948 and Act No. 47 of the Public Acts of 1921, being sections 460.401 to 460.403 of
the Compiled Laws of 1948. If a credit exceeds the amount of the assessment the
difference shall be credited to the general fund. Funds paid into the state treasury
under the provisions of Act No. 419 of the Public Acts of 1919 and Act No. 47 of
the Public Acts of 1921 shall be credited to a special account to finance the cost
of Jmblic utility regulation.
Sec. 5. All moneys paid into the state treasurr. by a public utility under this act
shall be credited to a special account, to be utilized solely to finance the cost of
regulating public utilities.
Sec. 6. Within 15 days after the receipt of any statement of amount assessed
under this act, the public utility may file with the commission objections setting
forth in detail the grounds upon which the assessment is claimed to be excessive,
erroneous, unlawful or invalid. The commission, after notice to the utility, shall
hold a hearing on the objections. If, after hearing, the commission finds the assessment is not excessive, erroneous, unlawful or invalid in whole or in part, it shall
record its findings and transmit them to the public utility and again mail or serve
a copy of the assessment upon the utility. Statements of assessment to which objections have not been filed, and statements of assessment and amended statements
of assessment mailed or served after a hearing upon objections shall be paid not
later than 30 days after their receipt. Assessments not paid when due shall bear
interest at the rate of 1% per month. Statements of unpaid assessments together
with interest thereon shall be recovered by the attorney general by appropriate
action.
Sec. 7. A suit or proceeding shall not be maintained in a court for the purpose
of restraining or delaying the collection or payment of an assessment made under
this act. A person or corporation making a payment under this act, believing the
amount to be excessive, erroneous, unlawful or invalid may file a statement of
claim with the court of claims. In an action for recovery of a payment made under
this act, the claimant may raise every relevant issue of law and fact, evidenced
by the record made before the commission. The court of claims may review questions of law and fact involved in a final decision or determination of the commis•
sion made under this act. The procedure providing for the determination of the
lawfulness of assessments and the recovery of payments made under this act shall
be exclusive of all other remedies and procedures.
Sec. 8. The commission may exempt a public utility from this act, if, after notice
and hearing, it determines that gross revenues derived from intrastate operations
is not a fair or equitable basis for assessing the costs of regulating that public
utility and prescribes a fair and equitable manner for assessing such costs of regulation.
Sec. 9. Any public utility over which the commission has jurisdiction solely
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 9 of the Public Acts of 1929, as amended,
being sections 483.101 to 483.120 of the Compiled Laws of 1948 or Act No. 16 of the
Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being sections 483.1 to 483,11 of the Compiled
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the conditional support of a number of the state's major utilities.153
S. 698, although not purporting to free the Commission from reliance
on the appropriations process, nevertheless has the potential to allow
the Commission significant discretion in determining the level of
expenditures for the regulation of the state's public utilities.
The bill provides that within thirty days of any legislative appropriation to the Department of Commerce, the Department shall
determine the "amount of the appropriation attributable to the
regulation of public utilities"154 and assess that amount against the
public utilities of the state according to a formula based on gross
revenue. The utility companies must pay the assessment within thirty
days after receipt of the statement of the assessment155 or file objections with the Commission.156 If objections are filed, the Commission
must hold a hearing after which the utility companies shall pay the
amount determined by the Commission to be properly assessable.157
Appeal may be taken from the Commission decision to the court of
claims but no proceeding shall be maintained for the "purpose of
restraining or delaying the collection or payment of an assessment."158
In its original form, S. 698 provided that all moneys paid by a public
utility would be credited to the general fund,159 but an amendment
to the bill adopted by the Senate provides that funds assessed and
Laws of 1948, or Act No. 144 of the Public Acts of 1909 as amended, being sections
460.301 to 460.303 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, shall pay fees as prescribed by the
commission in lieu of any assessment under the provisions of this act.
Sec. IO. This act shall take effect July I, 1972.
153. S. 698 is being considered in conjunction with S. 699, which was passed by the
:Michigan Senate on May 2, 1972. S. 699 allows utility companies to implement rate in•
creases without prior Commission approval if the Commission has failed to act upon
a request for a rate increase within ten months. Such rate increases could be ordered
reversed if Commission hearings found them to be unwarranted, and provisions are
made for bonding and refunds. Detroit Free Press, May 3, 1972, at 4-A, col. 1. Similar
processes are employed by other states; see Cramton, supra note 30, at 268-69, and IowA
CODE .ANN. § 490A.6 (Supp. 1972). The utilities strongly supported S. 699 because it
will alleviate the financial hardships imposed by regulatory lag. Because utility rates are
determined on the basis of a recently completed test year and the process of formal
hearings may be quite lengthy, during a period of rising costs a utility may earn less
than its allowable rate of return. By hastening the implementation of higher rates,
utility companies minimize the impact of regulatory lag. Recognizing that consumer
interests would object to S. 699, the utility companies have supported S. 698 as a
method of alleviating rate case backlog. See Comments of Robert W. Hartw'Cll, Executive Vice President for Finance, Detroit Edison Co., and Lloyd J. Haynes, Vice President,
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., Hearings on S. 698, Before the Senate Comm. on Taxation
and Veterans' Affairs, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess., March 14, 1972, on file with the Michigan I.Aw Review.
154. S. 698, § 2(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
155. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
156. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess, (1972).
157. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
158. S. 698, § 7, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
159. S. 698, § 5, as introduced, provided that "All moneys paid into the state treasury
by a public utility ••• shall be credited to the general fund."
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collected must be earmarked "to be utilized solely to finance the
cost of regulating public utilities."160
Unfortunately, S. 698 does not define with precision the terms
"regulation of public utilities"161 so that disputes regarding the interpretation of that clause may arise. While the clause clearly contemplates direct costs such as the salaries and expenses of the Public
Utilities Division and the Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division,
the most recent appropriation to the Department of Commerce includes many additional items that are indirectly, albeit indispensably, associated with the "regulation of public utilities." These items
include provisions for longevity and insurance, retirement, equipment, and contractual services and materials.162 Appropriations for
these expenditures, as well as a pro rata assessment for the salaries
and expenses of the Public Service Commissioners and their staff,
should be included in the assessment calculation. Since the Michigan
legislature does not retain reports of committee hearings nor transcripts of floor debate, a premium is put on clear, unambiguous
drafting. Therefore, S. 698 should be amended to provide more
precisely the expenditures contemplated by the assessment provision.
Even in the absence of more precise statutory delineation, a broad
interpretation is consistent with the argument that the "customers
served by such [utilities] who receive the benefits of state regulation
would pay the cost, rather than the general tax payers of the state." 1611
The utility companies are protected against a variance between
the annual appropriations on which the assessment is based and
actual Commission expenditures. Section 3 of S. 698 164 provides that
the Commission must deduct from the assessment in the subsequent
fiscal year the am9unt by which the sum appropriated in the current
year exceeded actual expenditures. Apparently designed to prevent
double assessment, section 4 of the bill160 provides that utility companies shall receive a credit against their annual assessment for any
amounts paid to the state under sections 1-3 of the Expenses of Audit
or Appraisal statute166 and sections 1-12 of the Public Utilities Commission Act of 1919.167 However, once S. 698 is passed, there is no
necessity for charging expenses to any specific company under existing statutes since the total appropriation for "regulation of public
utilities" will have been assessed under the provisions of S. 698.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

80 Mich. S.J. 1324, 1332 (1972).
S. 698, § 2(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
No. 130, [1971] Mich. Acts 10-11.
Analysis S. 698, June 21, 1971, supra note 152, at 2.
S. 698, § 3, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
S. 698, § 4, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967).
MICH, COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.51-.62 (1967).
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Therefore, the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal provisions and the
relevant section of the Public Utilities Commission Act of 1919 should
be specifically repealed concurrently with the passage of S. 698.168 The
failure to repeal outdated and useless statutes relating to utility regulation has been a characteristic of the Michigan legislature since the
days of the Railroad Commission. The consideration of S. 698 is a
good opportunity to clean up the statutes.
Section 6 of S. 698169 would give the utility companies a statutory
right to a hearing if they filed timely objections to the assessment.
Given the Commission's interpretation of the Expenses of Audit or
Appraisal law,170 it might appear that this section merely codifies
existing law. It is contended, however, that this section of S. 698 is
a significant modification of existing rights that works to the detriment of the Public Service Commission. The Commission's interpretation of the right of utility companies to compel a hearing when
charges are assessed is based on a 1935 Michigan supreme court decision.171 The Michigan Public Utilities Commission had ordered
an appraisal and audit of Consumers Power Company to determine
the reasonableness of the company's gas and electric rates. At that.
time the "company as a whole ha[d] never been subjected to investigation on the part of this Commission ...." 172 The Michigan supreme court held that the Commission "had no jurisdiction to make
the order appealed from without notice to the parties affected by the
complaints made to it." 173
That case is distinguishable from assessments that would be made
under S. 698 and that have been made under section 1 of the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal statute.174 The audit and appraisal
ordered in the Consumers Power case were made pursuant to what
is now section 6 of the Transmission Electricity Act175 and the court
based its holding on the specific language of the statute which provides:
Said commission shall also have power, in connection with any rate
or service hearing or investigation, to make such audit and analysis
168. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 and 460.61 (1967) respectively. Although
not mentioned in S. 698, MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 should also be repealed in
so far as it relates to assessments for audits. Failure to repeal that provision has caused
confusion regarding the right of utility companies to demand a hearing before paying
assessed charges. See notes 170-78 infra and accompanying text.
169. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
170. See text accompanying note 121 supra.
171. Consumers Power Co. v. Michigan Pub. Utilities Commn., 273 Mich. 184, 262
N.W. 664 (1935).
172. 273 Mich. at 185 n.•, 262 N.W. at 665 n.•.
173. 273 Mich. at 187-88, 262 N.W. at 664.
174. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.401 (1967).
175. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 (1967).
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. . • and said utility shall pay into the treasury of the state tl1e
amount of such expense ••• .176

The court said that "[t]he power conferred upon the commission is
'in connection ·with any rate or service hearing or investigation.' It
seems clear that the necessity therefor must be found to exist at a
'hearing or investigation .•. .' " 177 Since neither the current Expenses
of Audit or Appraisal provision178 or S. 698 contains similar limiting
language, it is inappropriate to conclude that absent a statutory right
to a hearing the utility companies have that right under state decisional law.
Since Senate bill 699 provides that the Commission must act
within a fixed time period or increased rates will automatically take
effect,179 giving utility companies a statutory right to compel hearings
might lead to its use to frustrate timely Commission consideration
of rate applications. Unlike section I of the Expenses of Audit or
Appraisal statute,180 which contains subjective terms that might be
misinterpreted, S. 698 contemplates assessments based on the objective criteria of amount of state appropriations, and thereby minimizes the possibility that the Commission might exceed its authority
in calculating assessments. Since utility companies would have the
ultimate resort to judicial review, it is both unnecessary and dangerous to provide a statutory right to hearings as is presently contained
in S. 698, section 6.1 s1
Given the operational impact of S. 698, it must be ultimately determined if that bill will give the Commission the necessary access
to funds sufficient to conduct the effective and timely regulation of
public utilities in Michigan. Obviously to the extent that the deficiency in the present funding provisions is due to the dependence
of the Commission on the annual state appropriations, S. 698 does
not alter this dependence. However, it is unrealistic to expect that
the legislature would grant virtual spending autonomy to the Public
Service Commission. Given the necessary search for a second-best
approach, S. 698 is potentially a satisfactory solution.
Because of the apparently wide scope of assessable charges contemplated by the phrase "regulation of public utilities," passage of
S. 698 would result in a substantial revenue gain for the State of
Michigan. Whereas under the present statutory framework only
minimal expenses have been assessed against public utilities,182 S. 698
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 (1967) (emphasis added).
273 Mich. at 187, 262 N.W. at 664.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.401 (1967).
See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.401 (1967).
S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972).
See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text.
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would make the activities of the Public Service Commission, which
are devoted to the regulation of utilities, essentially self-sustaining-unlike other state departments and operations. Regardless of
the level of state appropriations allocated by the legislature, there
will be no net impact on the state budget because that same level of
appropriations will be passed on to the utility companies through
assessments. Furthermore, under the amendment183 funds collected
·will be applied solely to the regulation of public utilities and hence
cannot be used by the state to subsidize any unrelated state activities.
Therefore, assuming that the Public Service Commission has a sufficient input into the appropriations process, there is no reason why
the legislature should deny the Commission effective de facto power
to set its own level of spending. The legislature would still have the
ultimate power to control the level of Commission spending, but
so long as the Commission did not abuse this de facto authority, it
would be permitted a measure of independence.184 Commission success in making its desired appropriations level known will ultimately
determine the success of this strategy. The Commission is not a substantial component of the Department of Commerce budget,185 and
it will therefore have to lobby hard to obtain recognition of its de
facto powers. Its message to the legislature is simple: everything we
spend is passed on to the utility companies and nothing we collect
can be used for purposes other than utility regulation.
Recognition of this measure of funding independence is also
subject to a second hurdle. Since the Commission will have to work
through the appropriations process, there is a strong possibility that
the utility lobbyists will exert a countervailing pressure within the
legislature to keep Commission appropriations low. The major
Michigan utilities retain full-time lobbyists186 and have a strong incentive to thwart timely and complete Commission consideration of
rate applications if S. 699 is passed.187 Although utility support of
S. 698 may contribute to its passage, the utility companies clearly
183. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
184. It has been argued that the bill
destroys all budgetary and legislative controls of the Public Service Commission.
The legislature would no longer have a direct and pecuniary interest in the
staffing and activities of the Commission in that all costs of operation would be
directly taxed (and thus recovered) from the subjects being controlled and regulated. This could lead to harassment and over regulation by the Commission
which ultimately would affect the efficiency of service to the public at large. There
are no controls in the proposed legislation.
Guregian letter, supra note 115, at I.
185. The Department of Commerce appropriation for fiscal 1971 is twenty-nine
million dollars, whereas the Commission budget is only three million dollars. No. 130,
[1971) Mich. Acts 1, 11.
186. Organizations Represented by Legislative Agents, July 1, 1971, on file with the
Michigan Law Review.
187. See note 153 supra.
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regard the bill as the necessary baggage to secure the passage of S.
699; 188 once the bills are passed, utility support of full and adequate
Commission :financing can be expected to disappear.
S. 698 provides the most far reaching and yet practical solution
to the funding difficulties presently faced by the Public Service
Commission. That bill retains ultimate legislative control over the
Commission but at the same time offers the Commission the practical
means to have a vital input into the determination of its annual appropriations. Passage of the bill would strengthen the representation of the public interest in utility rate proceedings.189
IV.

EVALUATION

Certainly a major difficulty in any attempt to analyze a state regulatory commission is the absence of any standard, absolute or comparative, by which to evaluate commission performance. An often
used standard is a comparison of utility rates between states. Such
a standard rests on the oversimplified assumption that low utility
rates can be equated on a one-to-one basis with the furtherance of
the public interest. But utility rates may reflect localized factors from
weather conditions to natural resource concentration, and may not
be an accurate measure of effective regulation. The variation of rate
structures makes comparison at any single level of consumption
dangerous, and any price comparison neglects to evaluate the efficiency of service provided. Given these deficiencies in rate comparisons, FPC data on electricity rates show that Michigan utility rates
are lower than the national average.190
If the attitude of professional analysts and investment bankers is
188. See note 153 supra.
189. It should be noted that neither bill is directly responsive to the "overkill" problem considered in the text following note 123 supra. S. 980 does not deter exorbitant
company spending, and S. 698 does so only indirectly to the extent that the Commission
will receive higher appropriations in order to keep up with the demands placed upon
it by numerous rate applications. This problem bas been considered in the context of
access to proxy machinery for stockholders challenging incumbent boards of directors
and management policies. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery,
83 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1506-08, 1512-15 (1970). A "defensive matching" concept, such
as is considered in the Eisenberg article, would be an interesting model on which to
base allocations for funding of intervenors. However, the analogy between stockholders
and intervenors breaks down because while in the stockholder context it is argued that
the insurgents may be conferring a corporate benefit through their objections to management policies or directors that are not in the best interests of the corporation, in
utility rate cases the interests of the intervenor are usually inimical to the utility, A
more direct solution to the "overkill" problem, which bas reportedly been urged by the
UAW and the Consumer Alliance of Michigan, is a fixed ceiling, perhaps calculated
as a percentage of gross revenues, on the amount of rate case expenses permitted.
190. See generally FPC, Typical Electric Bills: Typical Net Monthly Bill as of Jan,
I, 1970, for Residential, Commercial, and Industrial Services. Note, however, that FPC
data as of Jan. 1970 do not reflect three subsequent rate increases granted to Detroit
Edison Co. See note 8 supra.
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a useful measure of regulatory effectiveness, then the Michigan Public Service Commission is doing a strong job of protecting the public
interest because it is generally regarded as a strict commission.m And
yet, Commission rigor in maintaining a relatively low rate of return
for utilities does not ensure the efficient operation of the utility companies. Failure to anticipate growing demand forced Edison to go
into the bond market at a time of high interest rates, thereby burdening the company with high interest costs for the rest of this century,192 and failure to provide environmental safeguards has tied up
the operation of Consumers Power's nuclear plant on Lake Michigan.rn3 Both companies have seen their bond rating jeopardized.194
The movement of the Public Service Commission to require long
range planning in the Edison case195 and order a series of public
hearings to consider the state's energy needs over the next ten years196
indicates a belated, but welcome, recognition of the necessity of progressive and accurate utility planning. Adequacy of staff funding will
be a crucial determinant of its success.
·
- Because of the complexity of utility regulation, consumers are
not generally equipped to supervise the ingredients of any single
rate case such as rate base calculation, test-year adjustments, and
aggregate revenue requirements. Instead, the public must be content
to monitor the inputs into the decision-making process such as the
integrity of the Commissioners, the vitality and adequacy of the staff,
and the impartiality of the process. Beyond !hat, it must rely on its
appointed regulators and elected representatives to fulfill the public
trust. In the words of Franklin Roosevelt:
The regulating commission, my friends, must be a tribune of the
people, putting its engineering, its accounting and its legal resources
into the breach for the purpose of getting the facts and doing justice
to both the consumers and investors in public utilities. This means,
when that duty is properly exercised, positive and active protection
of the people against private greed.19 7
191. See Cooper, June 7, supra note 6, at 1, cols. 3-8; Bragg, Edison Battles To
Keep Bond Rating, Detroit Free Press, May 1, 1972, at 10-B, cols. 3-4.
192. Detroit Edison has 350 million dollars of long-term debt outstanding at interest
rates in excess of eight per cent. 1971 DETROIT EDISON ANN. REP. 30. See also Cooper,
June 7, supra note 6 at 12-A, cols. 3-4.
193. Lane, supra note 9, at 2-A, cols. 4-6. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
194. Lane, supra note 9, at 2-A, col. 3; Bragg; supra note 191, at 10-B, cols. 3-4.
195. See note 94 supra.
196. Serrin, supra note 9, at 3-A, cols. 3-6.
197. Address by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Portland, Ore., Sept. 21, 1932, quoted in
L. METCALF&: V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 91 (1967).

